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Abstract. 
The scientific literature that studies the Business cycles contains a historical debate between 
random and deterministic models. On the one hand, models built with explanatory variables 
follow a stochastic trajectory and produce, through transmission mechanisms, the studied 
cycles. Its rationale: the so-called Slutsky-Yule effect. In addition, models in which the system 
phase at time T fixes, applying the “ceteris paribus condition”, the phase at time t + 1. The cycle 
would be the product of variables, making it possible to predict and enabling economic policies 
to combat recessions. The thesis of this work is as follows. The application of the theorems of 
Chaitin of undecidability shows that it is not possible to conclude such debate. It is impossible 
to determine with absolute certainty whether the observed cycles follow a deterministic or 
stochastic model. To reach this result, I outline the fundamental theories of the business cycle, 
providing a classification and examples of mathematical models. I review the definition of 
randomness, and I consider the demonstration of Chaitin about the impossibility of deciding 
whether a data set is stochastic or not. A consequence, he says, of Gödel incompleteness 
theorems. I conclude considering a string of economic data, aggregated or not, as random or 
deterministic, depends on the theory. This applies to all cyclical phenomena of any nature. 
Specific mathematical models have observable consequences. But probabilism and determinism 
are only heuristic programs that guide the knowledge progress. 
Keywords: Randomness; business cycle theories; undecidability; heuristic.  
JEL classification: B40, D50, E32. 
AMS classification: 03F40. 
 
1.Probabilism and determinism in the Economic cycle theories. 
The Economic cycle consists of the variations that the activity of attached economic 
variables, such as the national income or employment, have over time, around a long–term 
tendency from which diverts. This movement is given as in nominal values as, deflecting, in 
real quantities. The second characteristic of the cycle lays on the fact that different economic 
strings show a positive or negative correlation in the cycle. It means, there is an ensemble 
movement along the variations (Diebold and Rudebusch, 1996: 67). An outfit movement which 
appears from cycle to cycle. To sum up, the historic recurrence of fluctuation lets and requires a 
general theory of the cycle. Theory which explains and preferably predicts.  
However, the cycles, although are recurring, are also irregulars in stage, space and time of 
repetition. So, the existence of cyclic determined movements is in doubt and it makes, at least, 
difficult to design models which make possible the prediction.  
The cycle is, as well, a problematic feature, because the theory builds models in which the 
economic agents, rationally acting, reach a position of balance among them. Why don´t the 
unstable cycles stop of repeating? 
Can we establish a level theory which lets describe properly the different observed cycles 
historically? Kingleberger (1985) denies it. However, I consider the Economic science moves 
forward with the constant attempt to refine general mathematical models to describe and predict 
with accuracy and generality, the economic events. Mathematics and modern science go hand 
by hand because Mathematics let know, forecast and promote the facts, and processes which 
wish being launched (Frey, 1972: 177). 
Being the business cycle theory necessary, an agreement has not been reached about a 
conceptual and general mathematic model until now. Alternative research programs exist. In the 
scientific literature, there are, at least, three perspectives (Ekkehard and Stockhammer, 2003:1). 
Keynesian theory of lack of effective aggregate demand, which explains the economic cycles as 
market failures due to rigidities in prices and/or salaries, or other factors, may reach a high 
involuntary unemployment.  
Secondly, the classic theory of return to the equilibrium of full employment throughout the 
operation of markets. Economy is always in a Walrasian equilibrium: combination of prices and 
quantities which simultaneously equalize supply and demand in the different markets of 
economy. The economic agents decide maximize their settlement, in the temporary horizon, 
with possible restrictions in the production possibilities and limits of resources.  
The business cycle is explained as a product with imperfections of market (asymmetric 
information, doubt, oligopolies, public procedures) or random exogenous shocks which cannot 
be provided (Tobin 1995: 32). It deals, therefore, about unpredictable exogenous factors or 
institutional eliminable elements. Nothing substantial to the market. The economic agents act 
with rational expectations and choose the best possible positions. The markets tend, by 
themselves, to a balance where they get empty in natural rates. 
Thirdly, Austrian theory, it is rather minor in the scientific literature, based on the alteration 
of intertemporal prices which are far from the preferences. Changes in the economic policy 
and/or modifications in bank credits which lead to different monetary interest types far from 
natural interest types and run into fluctuations by inefficient resource allocation. A correct 
monetary policy and institutional improvements, especially in the financial sector, can lead us to 
a world described by the classic theory. 
The classic theory says only the prices and real wages determinate the real quantities of 
production and employment, because the agents understand the impact of the prices and they 
discount them. The economy is constantly in balance of the system of Walrasian equations. 
While the Keynesian theory is still postulating real classic equilibriums (Tobin 1995: 38) based 
on the equality of the marginal productivity and disutility of labor, determining real salaries, 
volume of employment and output. But in that point, the markets don’t empty and involuntary 
unemployment can exist. The economic cycles are persistent and can´t only be explained by the 
evolution of real variables. The explanatory key is the slow adjustment in prices and wages. 
Even though mechanisms have been suggested which will produce the same result even with a 
complete flexibility of prices and wages. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) research the general 
impact of externalities (institutional incomplete markets and with incomplete information) over 
the global economic balance.  
The current classic theory is called Real Business Cycles theory (RBC) or Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium models (DSGE). The key contributions are Kydland and 
Prescott (2982), Long and Plasser (1983) and King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). They are 
introduced in a growing neoclassic model, with rational optimization by the agents, random and 
exogenous factors as stimulus of the cycle. Mainly, technological shocks.  
The classic theory is of the equilibrium one in natural rates. The Keynesian theory is of the 
disequilibrium one in prices and quantities or equilibrium one without emptying. The classic 
theory states the dichotomy between real and nominal variables. The Keynesian one not. 
The cycle theories are analyzed and put into groups according to their deterministic or 
stochastic character. I will discuss whether the inclusion of endogenous or exogenous variables 
have any relation with this character. I will classify the theories according to these two 
judgements. 
What is considered is whether the explanatory mathematic model of the observed cycles 
means the equal to a short program which let us deduce the long program or data set. If from 
this set of variables, connected among equations, we can find out how the cycle has happened 
and will happen. We can predict it.  
Chaterjee (2000) states that an evolution in the economic cycle theory exits. First analysis 
would be based on postulating factors which would produce determined fluctuations. Economic 
system factors which would develop peaks and crisis in an endogenous and unambiguous way. 
While later theories gave the cycles to the compound effect of random disturbances. Although 
the identification of these shocks would have been, until now, ambiguous or inaccurate. This 
author says an evolution appears from the first to the second way to explain the cycle and an 
almost current agreement about a string of random shocks are the key. Slutsky showed in the 
20s that random fluctuations can be at the base of the cycles. Later, Slutsky thesis or Slutsky-
Yale effect are analyzed. In a similar way, Benhabib and Farmer (1999) say the Modern Macro-
economy is based in DSGE models designed by the Real Economic cycles theory. In my 
opinion, however, both perspectives or stochastic and determinist programs coexist and debate 
(Mankiw, 1989) with various proposals of mathematic models. 
The final thesis of this work lays on, due to the impossibility of giving an empiric content to 
the concept of randomness and determinism, the main discussion is unsolvable and it will 
always happen in the economic theory. Models will be provisionally accepted and others 
rejected, according to the theory and data, but not to the related ideas about random or its denial.  
 
2. A simple guideline to analyze the empirical application of 
economic theories. 
When we state an event happens randomly, it is aimless; does this statement admit an 
empiric proof, or is it an unanswerable and irrefutable conclusion, from data? 
The criterion used to know if a scientific concept is observable is done by Bridgman´s 
operationalism. For that, I consider that random is a concept with observable reference only if 
there is an operation or operation set to find and measure such reference properly. The 
operations can be physical or mental. (Bridgman, 1927: 36) 
I don’t demand that the concepts have empiric contents, this is not the topic concerned. But it 
is demanded that, to have empiric contents, an operating procedure must exist. This guideline is 
restrictive and is effective to decide the empiric concept of the concept random. Also, it is equal 
to, dealing with this work, other formulations such as Hempel´s: A statement with the concept 
“random” would have the empiric meaning whether it was expressed in terms of observable 
characteristics of physical objects” (Hempel, 1950:10).  
In short, a concept has an empiric meaning “if we can assign numerical values to particular 
instances of it-if we can, in effect measure it under certain circumstances” (Gillies, 1972:8). If 
not, “random” won´t have this reference and will build other statements, without empiric 
foundation. 
Without an empiric reference, and out of analytical (tautologies) statements, some few 
concepts can have, however, a positive function in the science. Their functionality would be 
heuristic: basic concepts which give foundation to programs of research and alternative 
proposals. They must, therefore, have principles which let build contrastable and refutable 
alternative models up. The heuristic value of a concept is given in an environment of epistemic 
doubt, when there isn´t a final and complete solution to the problem given. In that situation, the 
construction of programs with possible alternative solutions would be essential. The 
mathematical models are refutable, but not concepts such as random and determination.  
 
3. The Determinism.  
Following to Ernest Nagel (2006: 371-441) and transmitting what he says about physics to 
the social sphere, a set of rules is deterministic for a system of variables, related to a kind of 
characteristics, if a phase of the system determinates unambiguously its phase at any other 
moment. The theory lets know what will happen to the considered system, whether we know all 
initial conditions. Indeterminism would be the mathematical model that doesn´t permit us to 
know the following phase of the system accurately.  
It means, the system is deterministic if a function F (model) exists, that knowing the values 
of variable in time T1, it gives values to these variables in time T2 and then in time T3 and so 
on (Bricmont, 2004:3). Once we know the values T1, it implies predictability. Under the 
assumption “Ceteris Paribus”: the non-included variables in the model don´t move”.  
This definition of determinism let get away from polemic about if determinism and 
coincidence have a necessary relation between them. In my opinion, the coincidence gives an 
unnecessary conceptual complexity.  
 
4. Random concept and Undecidability.  
I am starting from the concept of Randomization Kolmogorov-Chaitin (also found as 
Solomonoff). Volchan (2002: 60—61) believes that Martin-Löf definition about randomization 
is preferable, but it is equal to that concept.  
Program means instructions (rules) plus input. Elegant program is the smallest one which is 
able to generate a string of data. Data are produced randomly if the same string is its elegant 
program. It means, if the available short program, which generates the string, is as long as the 
string itself, it isn´t compressible. “A string is random if no program of size substantially 
smaller than the string itself can generate or describe it” (Volchan, 2003:56, Chaitin, 2004:22). 
Calude (2002) states, it means the absence of a command or model. These definitions are 
equivalent. “Intuitively, the slightest possibility to calculate an infinite fraction of a succession 
makes this is not random” (Mario Parra and Suarez, 2006. 166). Random implies 
unpredictability (Calude, 2002). 
Consequently, demonstrating that a string is random is to probe that it is its own elegant 
program. Proving is not random; it is to find a shorter elegant program.  
This definition leads to what we cannot know, if a string is stochastic or not accurately. We 
can´t know because any distribution of data could be done randomly, despite being more or less 
probable. Throwing a coin, the string “1001101011000” is as probable as “111111111111”: 
both options have a probability of 1/2
n  
. In this case 1/2
12
. However, we intuitively observe that 
a string has a bigger stochastic appearance.  
Chaitin thinks this characteristic comes from incompleteness of every formal reasoning 
system, so a border is placed to not overcome. Is a random string or it seems only? We don´t 
know, it is a limitation of the mathematics related with the incompleteness theorem of the 
formal systems minimally powerful for Gödel (Chaitin, 1975). This is an accepted result by the 
scientific mathematical literature.  
The demonstration can be done in different ways, and, as such, it is not subject in this work. 
The base is on the function which decides the complexity of a string: if it is a product of an 
elegant program and what is the size of that program. This function is not itself computable, so 
we cannot accurately decide the randomness of a string (Volchan, 2002:2). “If we could prove 
that a program is elegant, then that would enable to find a smaller program that produces the 
same output, contradiction!” (Chaitin, 2004: 109). In conclusion, it isn´t possible to determinate 
if a program is elegant or not. Because if it was possible, we would go into a contradiction.  
It means, there isn´t an algorithm that we can explain a string of data and answer to the 
question of whether a string is random or not. It is not possible to decide if a string is stochastic 
or not because we cannot prove it. We can only watch if a string seems more or less stochastic, 
so we can speak about pseudo-random strings when they have such statistical appearance. This 
inability to choose is the fundamental and unappealable result.  
It doesn´t exist a final, quantitative and qualitative procedure to find a string of data 
randomly. Nor otherwise. Operationally, it is a concept without operation. Random can have 
theoretical content, empiric approximations but never a complete empiric model  
 
5. Slutsky-Yale effect.  
Slutsky (1937) asked himself in 1924 (reproduced in 1937 in Econometry) whether random 
fluctuations may generate regular waves. It means, if strings with deterministic appearance 
(regular) could be, actually, generated by stochastic process. It is said coherent string in which 
the appearance of a value in a position depends on the previous or subsequent values of the 
variable (auto-correlation). An incoherent string doesn´t show this dependence.  
Barnett (2006) says Slutsky is defending two proposals. Firstly, adding random factors can 
generate phenomena with regular waves appearance. It means that the addition introduces in 
mutual independent events an oscillatory appearance, in which subsequent data have a 
dependence from the subsequent ones. Secondly, these fluctuations with wave aspect can seem 
cycles which show apparent regularity. “The summation of random causes may be the source of 
cyclic, or undulatory processes” (Slutsky, 1937:114) 
To prove these proposals, Slutsky uses a data mobile addition and tries to demonstrate that  
this process turns into coherent to incoherent strings. Giving as results, movements with cyclical 
appearance, similar to real economic cycles studied. For that, he compares the graphic of an 
economic cycle observed with the movement of data, stablished by the selection of a series of 
lottery numbers and doing a mobile addition of twelve. Adding the number of random factors, 
we will get, finally, to cyclical series equal to symmetrical functions. Also, these wavy 
movements would be identical to studied economic cycles. Slutsky used other procedures with 
similar results. All these methods share the fact of introducing a dependent structure among 
data.  
To conclude, Slutsky introduces an inductive proof about the possibility of variable 
randomly acting give a cyclical process in Economy. In general, it is a fact of wavy appearance. 
Inductive proof means it is an example, or several examples, of the possibility, and not a 
universal deductive demonstration.  
Yule (1926) thought about the same idea, referring to the appearance of the cyclical behavior 
in a string that is, actually, the result of stochastic factors. Oscillations which don´t appear in the 
original data. Yule would suggest (Alvarez Vazquez, 1996:320-1) an auto-countdown model for 
the economic cycle or equation in finite differences of second order, with the addition of a 
stochastic process or white sound.  
 
                           (1) 
 
Where the variable Y is related with its delayed values, and   are the coefficients. A process 
of white sound  is a succession of independent values among them and distributed identically. 
In a lax way, a string of values with a zero auto-correlation in every retardations and normality. 
The random coefficients and shocks are the key, once we get output data. The white sound 
process produce, right now, a string of impacts of cyclical appearance.  
The economic cycle would behave as a pendulum, with a white sound process t    hitting the 
pendulum randomly. It would generate a regular movement that is not true. It is calculated to 
solar spots, giving a period of 10,6 years. Where this autoregressive model is similar to a 
process of mobile additions of Slutsky type (Pollock, 1987), so: 
 
Yt t t q t q         0 1 1 ...        (2) 
  
As Pollock explains (1987), Slutsky and Yale are confirming the same type of dependent 
process of the random disturbances: “the affinity of the two sorts of process is further confirmed 
when it is recognized that an autoregressive process of finite order is equivalent to a moving-
average process of infinite order and that, conversely, a finite order moving–average process is 
just an infinite-order autoregressive process” (p.8). 
Kuznets (1929) accepted the following thesis: series serially auto-correlationed produce, 
through mobile additions, series with auto-correlation. Space and time of the cycles generated 
would depend on the distribution of random shocks and on the period of the mobile addition 
employed. The more elements we include in the series of a mobile addition, the higher the 
internal correlation in the series that we get. Frisch (1931) focused on the way to avoid spurious 
economic cycles. Moran (1950) agrees that applying mobile additions to a random string leads, 
in the limit, to perfect sinuous functions. 
It has also raised a second option or “realistic” interpretation: we have a “real” effect 
(Barnett, 2006), it is the addition of random “shocks” what produces a studied cycled. So, 
business cycles are explained as the addition of random causes, without the necessity to turn to 
any underlying regular factor, which becomes irrelevant. Business cycles would be phenomena 
of random foundation. The theory of real business cycles takes Slutsky-Yale effect as 
foundation, considering it as tested. The macroeconomic series would be nonstationary 
stochastic processes, without tendency, by the effect of real random factors. (Nelson and 
Plosser, 1982).  
This problem arises for all data series that present periodicity. “All activities in which the 
periodicity of time series was involved. Thus, it had direct relevance to all statistical 
manipulations of data” (Barnett, 2006: 6). 
The result of Chaitin says every answer to the Slutsky-Yale problem can only be an 
approximation. Never a certainty. We have series of cyclical appearance, in which to know if 
they are a product of random variables falls within Chaitin Undecidability theorem. It is only an 
approximation.  
Likewise, while Slutsky and Yale sharply set out the possibility that the studied cycles have 
random elements produced.  
From now on, the scientific literature has discussed about two different conclusions. The first 
option or interpretation “statistics” (Barnett, 2006) is that we have a statistical effect to bear in 
mind. A result due to the application of a procedure. Moving averages or others. A logical 
question arises: if we take a economic series of data and we do an careful study, avoiding a 
procedure of addition or average, can we avoid the problem exposed by Slutsky? If we improve 
the procedures, would we dismiss the generation of possible spurious business cycles? 
Likewise, a second option arisen or “realistic” interpretation: we have a “real” effect 
(Barnett, 2006): it is the addition of random “shocks” what a studied cycle produces. So, studied 
business cycles explain the addition of random causes, without resorting to any regular 
underlying effect which becomes irrelevant. Business cycles would be phenomena of random 
foundation. The real business cycles theory uses this Slutsky-Yale effect as a foundation, 
considering as approved. Macroeconomic series would be non-steady stochastic processes, 
without tendency, by the real random effect of factors (Nelson and Plosser, 1982).  
This problem arises for every series of data which have periodicity. “All activities in which 
the periodicity of time series was involved. Thus, it had direct relevance to all statistical 
manipulations of data” (Barnett, 2006:6). 
Chaitin result tells us every answer to Slutsky-Yale answer can only be an approximation. 
Never a certainty. We have series of cyclical appearance, in which to know if they are product 
of random variables falls within Chaitin Undecidability theorem. It is only an approximation.  
Also, although Slutsky and Yale sharply exposed the possibility that the studied cycles could 
have random elements which they produce, they left out the problem whether the presumably 
stochastic factors were or not. Let´s use the lottery series as an example of random series, it is a 
questionable assumption: because the statistical values of the series don’t fully coincide with the 
probabilistic assumption (Alvarez Vazquez, 1996:310). Alvarez Vazquez tries to prove that the 
regular cycles are already in the original data of the lottery string. “The cause of the regular 
cycles, studied in the series of mobile additions, is in the regular movements of the original 
series” (Alvarez Vazquez, 1996, 301). So, “the mistake of the argument in which Slutsky 
hypothesis lays on would be in assuming that the string of the first prizes (its last digits) were 
random, when it is only irregular” (Alvarez Vazquez, 2004:98). Since in the frequency field, the 
regular cycles don’t equally contribute to the variety as they should do in an ideal random 
series. The mobile average would create or destroy nothing.  
Therefore, the main previous problem to the interpretation is referred to the assumptions 
arose from Slutsky and Yale. Business cycles can be considered deterministic or random, but 
the factors which seem random can be questioned, as predicted Chaitin Undecidability theorem.  
 
6. Classification of the cycle, determinism and endogenousity 
theories.  
There isn´t any basic theory accepted by a scientific literature consensus and the discussion 
among alternative research programs is so complex.  
The two main research programs are Keynesian and classic. I have explained their 
conceptual basis. The classic theory uses the form of RBC theory, about the conceptual basis of 
the rational expectations of Lucas and models of general dynamic stochastic DSGE equilibrium 
are generated. The conceptual basis is in the general theory of the economic growth which 
comes from Solow, and, when the agents can choose all variables, specially savings, from 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans. The fluctuations of the cycle are necessarily the best answers for the 
economic agents to real exogenous shocks. On the Keynesian hand, from the 80s, it has looked 
for microeconomic fundaments for the temporary stiffness of the prices and salaries, and the 
effects of intuition about the risk in the corporate behaviour. Coordination mistakes, the 
imperfect competence, the stiffness in the assignment mechanism and nominal shocks are 
studied.  
A part of this Keynesian literature has adopted the DSGE form. In this mathematical model, 
for example Gali and Rabanal (2004), studies demanding random shocks instead of 
technological random shocks. Cho and Cooley (1991) introduced the nominal stiffness in the 
employment contracts. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) studied monopolistic competition with 
nominal stiffness, by contracts whose effect lasts in the time. Hairault and Portier (1993) took 
into account dynamic monopolistic competition with exogenous and random technology and 
money supply. And a long list. Models which link Keynesian principles in classic models.  
Another part of the literature, which has developed DSGE models, is distinguished by 
adopting the principle of indetermination in the evolution to the equilibrium or stationary state, 
or in the same stationary state. A “sunspot” shock, in this literature, is the impact that the 
expectations of the agents have when, not being based on the real evolution of the 
macroeconomic variables, have a final impact in the allocation. It means, it is a random variable 
that doesn´t affect to the economic foundations (endowment, preferences, technology) and isn’t 
established by them, and give that some different balances of consumption and production are 
possible. 
The expectations are auto-predictive: they are done on the mere fact that the agents believe. 
This capacity to have a so important impact comes from the fact that the models are incomplete 
and incorporate factors which expand the impact. The two more common elements are an 
incomplete working market with externalities, where there isn´t a balance between supply and 
demand, and scale economies in production function. Shell (1977) used the simple model of 
generations that comes before Lucas´ one (1972), using Samuelson`s one (1958) to introduce 
“sunspots” shocks which affect to the level of prices. Benhabib and Farmer (2994) proved that 
indetermination in a simple model, type DSGE, with scale economy can arise. Multiple 
equilibriums are possible and the final equilibrium is random. In closed models, with complete 
markets, the “sunspots” shocks would not have impact because the agents avoid any risk 
(Benhabib and Farmer, 1999). Otherwise, if the fundamental variables give a solution, the 
expectations could not significantly modify the final equilibrium, nor the way to it.  
Called by some authors as “Endogenous Business Cycle theory”, EBC theory, is endogenous 
because includes variables which turn the initial boosts into cyclical movements, whose values 
are decided within the equational system. But it still introducing exogenous triggering factors 
(Whitta-jacobsen 2004, Farmer 2012), and the expectations behave in random way and move 
out of the system.  
It is true that the technology is a key variable and the expectations are extrinsic. But there 
aren’t relevant conceptual differences between the impact of the technological factor in the RBC 
and the impact of the expectations of the agents in the models EBC, because in both cases are 
exogenous and random. The “sunspots” factors are added to technological shocks. Random 
movements which close the system.” Deterministic” and “indeterministic” doesn´t have to do 
with “determinate” and “indeterminate” in the EBC literature. “We say that the model is 
determinate if there is a unique equilibrium and indeterminate if there are multiple equilibria” 
(Mcgougha et al., 2012: 8). It means, it is determinate if the model is a solution, and 
indeterminate if it has several possible options. A RBC model is determinate, in this sense, and, 
however,  is indeterministic in the global defined sense in this work. 
The endogenous variables that would transmit and expand the initial shocks, producing the 
cycle, would be, among others, externalities in the production (Bernabib and Farmer 1994, 
Farmer and Guo 1994), complementarities in the intertemporal election (Azariadis, 1981), 
unfinished labour market, without labor supply (Azariadis, 1981; Farmer and Woodford, 1984), 
risk loans without collateral (Azariadis et al., 2015). An example is Benhabib and Nishimura 
(1998), with a model in which the expectations about the marginal value of the investments 
cause the double effect in increasing this investment, but, at the same time, reducing, through 
externalities of the labour market and leisure growth, with a final indeterminate effect.  
For Farmer (2012) and Farmer and Platonov (2016) the EBC models that involve 
indetermination in the way to steady determinate state are conceptually based on the classic 
theory. A function of beliefs closes the models and explains the stiffness of prices, in a context 
of rational expectations. The models which have, also, an indetermination in the steady state 
would be based on Keynesians foundations, producing the possible involuntary long-term 
unemployment. However, the decisive factor lies on indeterministic models in which the 
expectations develop randomly and are decisive.  
Thinking about these theories, I consider the model of the cycle can be classified according 
to two principles. If endogenous mechanisms about explanation of the cycle are introduced or 
not. And if the explanation is deterministic or probabilistic. Determinism and probabilism have 
already been defined. One or more auto-regressive equations, which have one or more white 
noise processes, are used to be introduced in the stochastic models. 
Endogenous variables are those whose value is determinate in the mathematical model: the 
variables determinate among themselves. Exogenous variables use non-fixed values within the 
system of equations. Exogenous variables can be random or deterministic, if their development 
hasn´t got observable or postulated model, or if they have it. The endogenous variables must be 
deterministic, because, from a value, el model determines the following.  
Moreover, it is necessary to discriminate between a trigger factor of the cycle and 
mechanisms of spread and persistence. A trigger factor is the movement which causes the first 
variation in macroeconomic variables. In the RBC theory, it is a exogenous technological shock. 
In the Keynesian theory, it can be a change in the expectation of marginal productivity of 
capital. Spread mechanism is the evolution of variables that cause the business cycle in the 
sense of persistent, continued and correlated movement of the macroeconomic variables. In the 
RBC theory, it is the inter-temporal replacement of leisure for work. In the Keynesian theory, it 
is the temporal stiffness of prices and/or salaries, and the perception of risk of the companies.  
In this classification, every research model or program can be placed as follows. The RBC 
theory and the before models to DSGE are exogenous and probabilistic in trigger factors. 
Technological shocks, if they behave in stochastic way. And endogenous one, in the spread 
mechanisms: decisions of replacement of leisure for work along the time.  
The classic theory, prior to RBC, problems of information, business competence and 
economic policies were admitted as spread variables. They have been added again.  
The Keynesian and neo-Keynesian theories don´t start from a representative agent or 
maximizing agents inter-temporally, but from macroeconomic variables in a holistic approach. 
Except, the school of thoughts that uses DSGE models. But these approaches, to belong to this 
research program, must share the conceptual foundation: exogenous and deterministic theories 
in the trigger factors. The models of accelerator-multiplier are an exception because they are 
endogenous. There is a drop in the aggregate demand, which generally isn’t described but 
deterministic. A stochastic mathematical model about this initial reduction is not raised And 
endogenous in the spread mechanisms. A process of failures of market, with limitations in the 
factor, monetary and/or good markets. Slow and pricey adjustments in prices and salaries, 
productive externalities, nominal shocks, imperfect competition (Standler, 1994).  
Finally, EBC models or of “sunspots” factors would display random exogenous trigger 
factors. Auto-predictive expectations, but also technology, that acting on the basis of incomplete 
markets and economies of scale, determine the result of such markets.  
 
7. Some mathematical developments in the theory of the cycle.  
The starting Keynesian models caused endogenous and deterministic cycles, in regular and 
temporal waves. They were based on the ideas of the multiplier and accelerator.  
About Samuelson´s model (1958), Hicks designs the theory with explosive macroeconomic 
movements, but it causes continuous cycles by the existence of floor and ceiling.  
Idea of the multiplier:  
 
C c Yt t  1           (3)  
Investment is the induced addition (accelerator) and the autonomous one (independent from 
the system):  
 
I I It t t 
' ''           (4) 
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         (5) 
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t'' ( )  0 1
         (6) 
 
Being National income, Yt, the addition of consume and investment. Model that generates a 
difference equation of second order. If v = 1, we have regular oscillations. If v > 1, we have 
divergent oscillations, in an explosive model that is what Hicks believes more probable 
(Samuelson disagreed). If v < 1, they are convergent oscillations.  
Divergent oscillations will produce regular and deterministic cycles by the existence of floor 
and ceiling, which make the movements to go bouncing (in a non-lineal model). The floor is the 
accelerator retention which makes the induced investment turn negative and equal to the 
depreciation. And the ceiling is the potential product or full employment, determined by the 
quantity of productive factors and the existing technology. 
The regularity of the fluctuations is the product of a deterministic model, but it doesn´t seem 
supported in data. Although it could be argued that ceteris paribus cycles occur, so other factors 
may be changing the frequency. We have the challenge of introducing such variables.  
Later Keynesian models were divided about the trigger factor. Some models still include an 
endogenous and deterministic factor. Others don’t allow anticipate the first fact which triggers 
that market failure. And in this sense, the models are incomplete. But randomization is not 
postulated and later mechanism is deterministic. Finally, there are models which introduce 
exogenous and random demand models, but it is debatable that they fall within this approach. In 
all cases, the idea which links them lays on what the balance of the market can be unreachable, 
in an irreversible way, without ad hoc interventions of public policies. The cycle would be a 
natural fact of economy.  
The fact the Keynesian models are divided because of introducing exogenous and 
endogenous factors comes from Keynes´ thought. Keynes (1936) explained the cause of the 
economic cycles was the movement in the marginal efficiency of the capital. But it didn´t deal 
with an automatic mechanism, nor necessarily cyclical because the key wasn´t only the marginal 
value to the last invested currency unit, but also the perception we have of this performance. 
What in later literature is sometimes called “animal spirits”. Keynes claimed in his General 
Theory, 1936, the possible impact of expectations: “it is not so easy to revive the marginal 
efficiency of capital, determined, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of 
the business world” (Keynes, 2008:288). The return of confidence would be a difficult factor to 
manage (Minsky, 1986).  
Market failures would provoke non-efficient situations in Pareto terms. There is not market 
emptiness. Goods without being sold, unemployed work, idle capital. The economic agents 
would like to be in another transfer point, but they can´t. Recessions would produce a lower 
social welfare: there are economic agents that could improve without being detrimental to 
others. As opposed to this classic school of thought which defends that Economy is always in an 
ideal Pareto situation. The cycle would have as last explanation, monetary factors (nominal 
variables) which work in necessary way, from a first trigger factor. There isn´t classic 
dichotomy.  
As an example, the simple model exposed by Romer (2006) about stiffness prices, flexible 
wages, competitive labour market.  
 
              (7) 
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Maximum Y exists. π is the price level, L is the number of workers and Ls is the labor 
supply, which is growing referring to the real wage. L
s
>0.  
The production function depends on the only productive factor which is work, and it has 
positive labor productivity, but decreasing. The labor demand is determined by the points which 
meet that the labor marginal productivity is similar to the real wage.  
The stochastic factor doesn´t exist in this model. The evolution is again deterministic. But 
the trigger cause must be necessarily exogenous. An initial moving in demand develops a cut in 
the income Y. The model doesn´t generate steady cycles, so a continued mechanism which 
provokes imbalances is left.  
Some alleged neo-Keynesian theories mix, by contrary, stiffness in prices and wages, 
oligopolistic factors with random shocks of technological and monetary character (e.g., Hairault 
and Portier, 1993).  
Lucas (1972) develops a theory of the cycle in a conceptual classic context. The cause of the 
economic cycle would be the imperfect information related to the prices. The agents would 
believe, erroneously, that general movements in the level of prices are movements in relative 
prices, taking decisions to increase the production, and labor demand and generating cycles. 
Investments based on an incorrect prevision of prices lead, first to boom and later to bust. It 
deals with an exogenous and random theory. The difference between the price of the sector and 
the real price follows a stochastic evolution:  
 
               (10) 
 
Where j refers to a good, pt is the general level of prices. The price of the good (sector) 
stochastically varies according to the general level of prices, since ε is a white sound. The 
supply of each company depends on the expectation that the evolution of prices of its products 
has, against the general level of prices. The bigger dispersion of prices of the sectors according 
to the general prices, the bigger differences will be given and more cycles. This is the 
institutional component which expands or reduces the exogenous shocks. Although it is difficult 
to think this mechanism is enough to generate studied fluctuations in real variables (Mankiw, 
1989).  
In the classic or Walrasian theories, the agents behave rationally, in such way that a position 
of equilibrium is always placed (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982). Changes in nominal variables 
are immediately adapted: general movements in the price level don´t modify the supply and 
demand equilibrium (Lucas, 1977). It is an efficient Pareto situation, the economic cycles would 
be efficient and optimum positions of the economic system (Long and Plosser, 1983). 
Unemployment is never involuntary.  
We get to the so called classic dichotomy (Mankiw, 1989:80). The monetary supply is 
exogenous, the monetary demand is determined by the output level and price level, but it 
doesn’t operate in the Walrasian equilibrium. Real and nominal variables don’t influence 
between them because money doesn´t impact on resource allocation, monetary variations leave 
to the real variables unchanged.  
It is unavoidable that the Walrasian school of thought, focused on the general inter-temporal 
equilibrium: where the possibility disequilibrium in markets is excluded, explains the economic 
cycles from exogenous factors which impact in a random way. Randomness is the necessary 
motor of the studied cycles. Among these factors, the main one is in technological changes 
(technology is empirically quantified as productivity of all factors totality, within a Solow 
quantification of growth). Productivity would move randomly giving the studied economic 
cycles (Stadler, 1994:1752). Recession would be a period where productivity capacities of 
society have fallen. Other secondary variables exist such as movements in consumers´ tastes. 
Exogenous and stochastic movements modify relative prices and force rational agents to 
adjust labor supply and consumption level. This is the mechanism of transmission which gives 
depth and cycle persistence. What it leads to changes in produced quantities. New decisions 
about the job offered (decisions about how much leisure must be sacrificed along the labor life) 
are the key. The mechanisms of transmission turn the punctual and stochastic shocks into 
persistent cycles.  
Unemployment grows in recessions because people decide to sacrifice less leisure, because 
the labor productivity and real wage have gone down (relative cost of leisure). It is decided to 
change current work for future. Labor supply is reduced. National output falls. However, this 
mechanism should be weak. An increase in real wage give bigger value to work (price effect), 
but also the income increases (income effect). A slowdown gives less value to work, but also it 
generates a downfall in income, giving a positive boost to the labor supply which counters, at 
least partially, to replacement effect. So, even if the real wage behaved in a pro-cyclical way, its 
impact would be reduced.  
Other mechanisms of transmission: goods in stock that the company keeps, decisions of 
investment which affect to the capital stock, delays in process of investments. The global 
weakness in mechanisms of transmissions explain the introduction of nominal shocks and 
stiffness of Keynesian inspiration. 
Mathematically, these models vary about structure and common assumptions: neoclassic 
model of capital accumulation to which stochastic models of productivity are added. About 
rational expectations and market emptiness, families maximize a function of usefulness, 
companies maximize a function of benefits. Shock expand themselves and persist by the 
intertemporal substitution of work and leisure, and by the impact about investment and the 
capital shock. 
The model of Long and Plosser (1983) is one of the paradigmatic contributions of RBC 
theory, it consists of: 
- A function of Cobb-Douglas production, with neoclassic conditions.  
- A technology which evolves with deterministic temporal tendency and an additional 
random perturbation which behaves as an auto-regressive of first order (AR(1)) process, 
and white noise εt variable is also added.  
- A representative consumer who maximizes a usefulness that depends on consumption 
and leisure (so, on work), limited by the budget constraint which relates consumption 
with work.  
- A closed economy is supposed.  
- The rate of accumulation in capital, which depends on the national output, and the 
savings rate.  
- Facilitating assumptions which make the savings rate and labor supply fixed. 
In this model, the process AR(1) in technology generates a solution for the national product 
“per capita” of AR (2), or auto-regressive process of second order: 
 
  
           
        
                        (11) 
 
Where α is the participation of capital in the national income (exponent in the function of 
Cobb-Douglas production), δ is the auto-regressive coefficient of the technological 
perturbations. The variables are expressed in cyclical values, data without tendency. The second 
parameter is negative, what it generates cycles.  
In RBC models, the technological progress is exogenous and, also, must be. According to 
Euler theorem, since capital and work are rival factors which gain, in competence, the same as 
their marginal product. So:  
 
    
  
  
    
  
  
          (12) 
 
There are no resources to pay the technological progress, so it must be necessarily 
endogenous (Sala-i-Martin, 1994:42-43). The economic growth is at long-term, and the cycles 
are explained by non-explained changes nor explainable by the technology.  
Romer (2006) presents a standard RBC model characterized by the following equations, with 
a function of neutral Cobb-Douglas production of Harrod.  
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The evolution of capital comes determined by: 
 
                     (15) 
 
Technology follows a growing temporal tendency and it is subjected to random shocks:  
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Where g is the coefficient of temporal growing in technology, y    1 1 .  t  is a process of 
White noise. At * is the neoclassic component in technology, again AR(1). It can be reduced to 
a weighted sum of different random process in a potentially infinite succession. 
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Later, introducing in the production function, we have: 
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All technological shocks have long-term effect.  
The mechanism of propagation, work and leisure decisions, is understood from utility 
function of a representative agent which relates consumption c and work l, with the restriction 
of wage w and real interest rate r. 
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With the restriction: 
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Getting, in a scenery of some temporal periods, to the expression: 
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Where ρ is the discount rate. The labor supply in every period responds to the corresponding 
wage, but also to the interest rate. But in the model, interest rates and relative salaries evolve in 
opposite directions, offsetting their effects on intertemporal substitutions between leisure and 
work: on the labor supply.  
Finally, Walrasian school of thought hasn´t explained nor The Great Depression of 1929, nor 
the great recession of 2008 (Farmer, 2012). Also, some regularities in data must be explained, 
they don´t seem coherent with the theoretical model. Firstly, a recession is related with less 
consumption and more leisure. What is difficult to understand being both goods normal 
(Mankiw, 2989:82). The only one explanation of this phenomenon, for the model, would be in 
which the real wage goes down. But there are less workers in a recession, its labor marginal 
productivity goes up and therefore, the real wage should also go up. That would be anti-cyclical. 
One of the facts to explain the theory of business endogenous cycles or with “sunspots” shocks 
(Schmitt-Grohe, 2000). 
Secondly, neither pro-cyclical movements of prices. It is a polemic about Philips curve at 
short and long term. So, this school of thought tries empirically to prove that prices don´t 
behave in this way. 
Thirdly, real cycle theory says currency fluctuations are based on the variations of money  
demand for transactions (King and Plosser, 1984) . But it is questionable the inexistence of 
movements, in some cases, independent from the central bank or other factors.  
To which two fundamental problems are added. On the one hand, big technological shocks 
aren´t detected empirically to explain big recessions. On the other hand, can the productivity or 
technological possibility of the economic system be allied as if it hasn´t got any relationship 
with it? It is true that full productivity of factors ranges in time (Prescott, 1986) and behaves in a 
pro-cyclical way dropping in recessions. But: Is it the factor that provokes the crisis, or is it the 
result because the crisis gives low return sub-employments to workers and an important part of 
the leisure capital? It deals with a theoretical problem, since it is impossible to make empirically 
a difference between cause and effect.  
After all, one of the neoclassic growing models of criticism is technology is placed as a main 
factor of growing, but it is unexplained and unexplainable. Kondratieff and Stolper thought the 
technical fluctuations are not random and have the economic development as origin. The 
technique will evolve at the wavy long-term rhythm. Thus, they state a serious mistake would 
be to think the direction and intensity of findings and inventions is “accidental” (p.112). 
Considering technical changes are given randomly lacks of basis, being rather a product of 
economic necessities (p.112).  
It seems, therefore, difficult to keep that technology is exogenous and not endogenous. In 
such way, the cycles would generate endogenously, at least, a part of technological oscillations. 
Endogenous technological growth models should be introduced, for example Romer´s model 
(1986) among many others.  
If the endogeneity of technological fluctuations is subject of discussion, public spending is 
much more. Its endogenous and anticyclical character, according to automatic stabilizers and to 
the evolution of tax capacity, is clear.  
At last, the investigation program, that comes from DSGE models and adds “sunspots”, is 
there. The indetermination means the model is not closed and a number of endless possible 
equilibriums can be given. This indetermination had been traditionally considered as a weakness 
of the model, which should be avoided. However, this element is used in this program as a key 
to explain business cycles (and other empiric facts such as the transmissions of monetary boosts 
and economic growth) as Benhabib and Farmer (1999) defend. Azariadis (1981) presented a 
Lucas model (1972) of simple economy with succeeding generations, under extrinsic 
uncertainty.  
Beliefs about the future will determinate the final equilibrium in these incomplete models 
that don’t give any solution but a set of possible equilibriums. Beliefs that act randomly, 
prediction is impossible. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) present a simplified model which must be 
valid for different exposed models, along the way of the balanced growth. We have in this 
model:  
 
                              (23) 
                    (24) 
 
Where “y” is the vector of endogenous variables, “x” is the vector of economic policy 
variables, “u and v” are stochastic shocks. A, B, C and D are parameters. Equations must meet 
the conditions to get the emptying of markets. It is observed that this model introduces two 
white noise processes, accompanying an expectation about future. If the rational expectation 
hypothesis is accepted in a uncertainty situation: the agents exactly know the model but they 
don´t know the exact value of parameters. Using an adaptive learning in the agents, by which 
they suppose the values in t+1 will be the same than in t, and introducing values of x1 expressed 
as the result of random present and heavy perturbations:  
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Where the values yt and yt-1 are equal and therefore a temporal equilibrium happens.  
Consequently, rational agents, adaptive learning, temporal equilibrium, the final solution 
would be an addition of random perturbations in time. We are in the same intellectual schedule 
of RBC models.  
Duffy and Xiao (2005) study if a RBC (DSGE) model of equilibrium with rational 
expectations, in a reduced way, and with a dynamic of adaptive learning, can generate an 
undetermined and stable equilibrium. Indetermination lets non-fundamental variables 
“sunspots” boost the model and generate cycles (Farmer and Guo, 1994).  
Under rational and adaptive expectations, the agents identify the model but not the exact 
value of the coefficients. The equilibrium will be stable if the estimating of the coefficients 
keeps a close and sustained setting of the real coefficients. It means, if the differential equation 
is locally stable.  
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Where “a” are the estimated coefficients and “T(a)” are the real coefficients.  
Duffy and Xiao (2005) analyze the solutions of the three more relevant models: Farmer and 
Guo (1994), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and Wen (1998). They study the conditions under 
which RBC models with “sunspots” shocks and rational expectations get undetermined and 
stable equilibriums.  
The reduced model exposed by Duffy and Xiao (2005) is:  
 
                       (29) 
                            (30) 
 
Where “k” is the capital shock and “c” is the consumption one. The coefficients are “a”. The 
impact of expectations on the consumption is determinant and therefore, on the investment and 
evolution of the capital shock. The expectations are formed in an autoregressive process AR(1).  
 
                           (31) 
 
The vector of endogenous, capital and consumption variables is “y”. the vector of extrinsic 
expectations is “s”, “ε” is white sound. The typical autoregressive progress, with accumulation 
of stochastic boosts, of the RBC (DSGE) models is observed. It is a model similar to the used 
one, to analyze the same problem, by McGough et al. (2013). Those who modify in the first 
equation kt+1 by Et k t+1 = al k t+ a2 ct  ,  introduce “e”  in the second equation to the capital shock 
in time “t”.  
 
                                (32) 
 
Duffy and Xiao (2005) reach the following conclusion. Under adaptive learning, in RBC 
models with “sunspots” shocks, restrictions in parameters avoid undetermined and stable 
equilibriums simultaneously. Agents don´t get the expectation and parameters to bring closer to 
their real values. The coefficient a4 must be negative (nothing credible: the consumer wants to 
maintain a steady path of consumption) to get stability, but it must be positive to get 
indetermination. Economy is either stable and determined or unstable and undetermined. Or the 
idea of rational expectations would not hold. McGough et al. (2013) maintain the condition that 
a4 must be negative. And Benhabib and Farmer (1994) condition: the demand curve has positive 
slope and higher in absolute value than the labor supply curve. They are empiric and 
theoretically is hardly plausible. In conclusion, however, it is limited to some existing models so 
far.  
 
8. Conclusions 
The classic theory has produced the real RBC business cycle theory and the stochastic 
models of general dynamic DSGE equilibrium. These models state the business cycles are the 
result of random and exogenous variables. These factors are used because their conceptual 
fundament is the theory of Walrasian equilibrium, throughout neoclassic models of economic 
growth. Rational agents will always take decisions that empty markets, in positions of Pareto 
boost. Hence they use a realistic interpretation of Slutsky-Yale effect. On the one hand, the 
economic growth is based on random exogenous factor unexplained and unexplainable. On the 
other hand, a real random movement behind the fluctuating image of the empiric cycle is 
equally presented. The theory of the cycle is unable to predict and with great difficulties to 
explain big recessions and some macroeconomic correlations.  
In this scheme, the “sunspots” shocks involve the addition of stochastic extrinsic variables, 
but don´t modify the conceptual base, nor the mathematical models. With the problem of 
making compatible the indetermination and the stability.  
 Keynesian theory explains the business cycle as positions of disequilibrium, in which 
markets don´t empty, nor get a situation of Pareto boost. Keynesian classic models establish 
endogenous and deterministic focuses, producing regular cycles. Its main problem lays on they 
aren´t apparently compatible with the studied business cycles, with an irregular deepness, time 
and recurrence. Thanks to inapplicability of the “ceteris paribus” term is possible to explain, but 
then the target is to incorporate unknown factors gradually. As Russell (1914: 230) points when 
the constant relationship among groups of facts fails at a certain moment, “it is usually possible 
to discover a new, more constant relation by enlarging the group”. 
The later Keynesian theory has kept the conceptual heart which states the markets cannot 
empty, and the involuntary unemployment is possible at long-term; but it was made removable 
models. On the one hand, microeconomic fundaments have been looked for the temporal 
stiffness of prices and the uncertainty of the noticed risk. Leaving the beginning of cycles to an 
initial change in the effect demand, exogenous, and a determined change would be supposed.  
The adopted operationalist approach demands the existence of a measure procedure, to have 
an empiric content, which establishes the observable reference with accuracy. Approach which 
requires from the random concept, and therefore, from the determinism as univocal relationship 
with the system values over time. But Chaitin theorems show that the random concept doesn´t 
give that measure procedure: we cannot know certainly if a set of data accomplish or not, so it is 
necessary to conclude that it is strictly a theoretical concept. Equally, the determinism is so. The 
statements that use random process, or deny them to assert deterministic strings lack of empiric 
reference: they cannot, and will never do, be verified nor falsified with accuracy.  
As statements and equations used in concepts or variables related with the random concept, 
positive or negative, don´t have empiric reference, nor own definition value or tautology 
(because information is added); only heuristic value can be owned. They would be research 
proposals. We can suppose the studied data are produced by a deterministic model. And we can 
also suppose, by contrary, that they are produced by a set of random variables. The theory 
determines these assumptions. It is empirically impossible to decide between both possibilities. 
So, they are not approved statements, but research proposals.  
Random and determinism would be, therefore, two contrary programs which help to build 
models, evaluable theoretically and contrasting quantitatively. More or less plausible. Even with 
clear reprehensible results, in some cases, from the coherence with the general theory, and from 
sets of data. But the selection and possible rejection of models do not imply the final and 
definitive answer to the problem if the cyclical phenomena behave in one way or another. It is 
an untouchable limit of the human knowledge.  
The historic discussion between models of the stochastic business cycles and deterministic 
models do not get to a conclusion. As in any other scientific field which uses these concepts as 
research projects.  
Finally, if we ask science to predict, or at least we consider it useful if it does, with the final 
goal to avoid mistakes in economic policies, then, deterministic theories give a step forward to 
the usefulness of science. The models of the cycle and the growth of the classic theory cannot 
predict. Keynesian models with endogenous factors and deterministic evolution make up a more 
ambitious proposal.  
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